

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<small>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.</small>				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 5 June 1998		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 5 August 1997-5 June 1998
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Attack Helicopter <i>Premobilization</i> Proficiency of United States Army Reserve Attack Helicopter Battalions			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major David L. Gruenwald				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Avenue, Bell Hall Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) Attack helicopter battalions are combat maneuver units that conduct supporting attacks which aid, protect, and compliment other maneuver forces by destroying massed enemy mechanized forces and other enemy forces with aerial firepower, mobility, and shock effect. They are employed as a battalion in order to provide the commander with this highly mobile and lethal destruction capability. The fundamentals of attack helicopter operations do not change by component. Reserve Component attack helicopter battalions are expected to perform attack helicopter operations to the same level of proficiency or standard as the Active Component. Currently, there is conflicting guidance published by Forces Command as to what level of proficiency aviation units in the Reserve component should train to in premobilization in order to prepare for their wartime mission. This study examines the ability of United States Army Reserve (USAR) attack helicopter units to maintain proficiency at the battalion level in a premobilization environment. It focuses on the resources available to Reserve units and the training requirements placed on a unit. It concludes with an analysis of a USAR attack helicopter units ability to execute all training requirements in the time available to them each training year. It offers recommendations on possible alternative training strategies and provides suggestions for further research.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Attack Helicopters, US Army Reserve, Helicopter Battalions, Premobilization			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 75	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	

19980731 047

PREMOBILIZATION
PROFICIENCY OF UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
ATTACK HELICOPTER BATTALIONS

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID L. GRUENWALD, MAJ, USA
B.S., Central Michigan University, 1986

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1998

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PREMOBILIZATION
PROFICIENCY OF UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE
ATTACK HELICOPTER BATTALIONS

A thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID L. GRUENWALD, MAJ, USA
B.S., Central Michigan University, 1986

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1998

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ David L. Gruenwald

Thesis Title: Premobilization Proficiency of United States Army Reserve Attack
Helicopter Battalions

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chairman
MAJ Joseph E. Thome Jr., M.A.

_____, Member
LTC Jesse D. Kreinop, B.S.

_____, Member, Consulting Faculty
MAJ Bruce A. Leeson, Ph.D.

Accepted this 5th day of June 1998 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brooks, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PREMOBILIZATION PROFICIENCY OF UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE ATTACK HELICOPTER BATTALIONS by MAJ David L. Gruenwald, USA, 75 pages

Attack helicopter battalions are combat maneuver units that conduct supporting attacks which aid, protect, and compliment other maneuver forces by destroying massed enemy mechanized forces and other enemy forces with aerial firepower, mobility, and shock effect. They are employed as a battalion in order to provide the commander with this highly mobile and lethal destruction capability. The fundamentals of attack helicopter operations do not change by component. Reserve Component attack helicopter battalions are expected to perform attack helicopter operations to the same level of proficiency or standard as the Active Component.

Currently, there is conflicting guidance published by Forces Command as to what level of proficiency aviation units in the Reserve component should train to in premobilization in order to prepare for their wartime mission.

This study examines the ability of United States Army Reserve (USAR) attack helicopter units to maintain proficiency at the battalion level in a premobilization environment. It focuses on the resources available to Reserve units and the training requirements placed on a unit. It concludes with an analysis of a USAR attack helicopter unit's ability to execute all training requirements in the time available to them each training year. It offers recommendations on possible alternative training strategies and provides suggestions for further research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
LIST OF TABLES	v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE	17
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	31
4. ANALYSIS.....	45
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	60
BIBLIOGRAPHY	67
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	74

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. INDIVIDUAL REQUIREMENTS	35
2. UNIT REQUIREMENTS.....	38
3. MANEUVER TRAINING STRATEGY	39
4. GUNNERY TRAINING STRATEGY	40
5. ADDITIONAL FLIGHT TRAINING PERIOD ANNUAL AUTHORIZATIONS	44
6. TRAINING TIME - INDIVIDUAL REQUIREMENTS	50
7. TRAINING TIME - UNIT REQUIREMENTS	51
8. TRAINING TIME - MANEUVER TRAINING STRATEGY	52
9. CONCURRENT TRAINING	57
10. TIME AVAILABLE TO UNITS (ANNUAL).....	59

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. ANNUAL TRAINING - GUNNERY	66
2. ANNUAL TRAINING - COLLECTIVE TRAINING.....	67

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to discuss the expected level of proficiency of United States Army Reserve attack helicopter battalions and examine their capability to meet these requirements. Chapter 1 builds the foundation for the study by providing background information, as it pertains to the study and by defining key terms that will aid in understanding the study. The chapter provides a description of the study and discusses the research methodology the thesis will employ, its application to the study, and conclusions which may be drawn from this particular method.

Chapter 2 discusses the literature relating to the topic, including sources already consulted as well as potential supplemental sources which may aid future research methods. The chapter first presents a historical perspective demonstrating the significance of training in two combat scenarios, one a failure and the other a success. It then addresses two articles published that address training problems in the Reserve Component and the importance of focusing training in preparation for its combat mission. This is followed by a review of the publications the Army uses today that lay the foundation for all training conducted in preparation for combat. Finally, publications used in direct support of the study are addressed. The chapter also identifies gaps that exist in literature as it relates to this study.

Chapter 3 identifies the specific research approach to the thesis. The chapter identifies the specific instruments used and the procedures for collecting and tabulating evidence that supports the study. Two steps are followed in this chapter to identify and tabulate evidence. First, the chapter conducts a detailed discussion of resources available to the unit. The studies focus is on the different time resources available to the unit. Next, training requirements are identified and discussed. For the purposes of this study, only training requirements are addressed. Once all resources and requirements are identified, an analysis of the evidence is conducted in the next chapter.

In chapter 4, the study conducts an analysis of the evidence that was identified and discussed in chapter 3. The analysis is conducted in the form of a comparison. Resources, as identified in the previous chapter, are compared to training requirements. To accomplish this, a duration of time is assigned to each training event. The result of this comparison identifies whether or not a unit has enough time available to it to accomplish all required training.

Finally, chapter 5 integrates the discussion in the previous chapters and provides a conclusion to the evidence presented in chapter 3 and analyzed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses and recommends possible alternatives available to these units. It also provides suggestions on topics, identified during the conduct of the study, that are possible areas for further research.

Problem Statement

Attack helicopter battalions, regardless of component, are expected to maintain a level of proficiency that will enable them to deploy and conduct attack helicopter operations as part of a combined arms team. The attack helicopter battalion is a combat maneuver unit that conducts supporting attacks which aid, protect, and compliment other maneuver forces in the execution of their mission. The attack helicopter battalion supports other combat maneuver units by destroying massed enemy mechanized forces and other enemy forces with aerial firepower, mobility, and shock effect. It is employed as a battalion and provides the commander with a highly mobile and lethal antiarmor, antipersonnel, antimaterial, and air-to-air destruction capability during both day and night operations. Attack helicopter battalions are used throughout the spectrum of conflict from low-to-high intensity. They are expected to fight at different levels in the spectrum according to their mission-essential task list and the mission of the larger unit to which they are assigned. The fundamentals of attack helicopter battalion operations do not change with the intensity of conflict.¹

Active Component attack helicopter units conduct rigorous training throughout the year, both in garrison and in the field, in order to meet mission requirements. Attack battalions in the United States Army Reserve (USAR), upon mobilization, are required to meet the same mission requirements as their Active Component counterparts without the benefit of the same time available for training. The USAR currently has two attack helicopter battalions. These battalions are assigned to active component brigades upon mobilization. Once mobilized and deployed with their wartrace headquarters, these

battalions are expected to be at the same level of proficiency as their sister active component battalions.

Premobilization training of Reserve units is designed to produce combat ready units proficient in their mission essential tasks capable of fighting in accordance with current doctrine. Forces Command (FORSCOM) Regulation 350-2 prescribes levels of readiness for different type units. The guidance established in this regulation is very specific for infantry, armor, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Each unit is given a specific training objective. CS and CSS training objectives require unit proficiency to the company level. Armor and infantry units are directed to train to platoon level maneuver and crew level gunnery qualification.²

FORSCOM Regulation 350-2's guidance is not as clear and succinct for aviation units. Aviation units are directed to train to a minimum of company level proficiency.³ The key word here is minimum. By directing a minimum level and not a specific level as done for other units, it allows room for interpretation as to what level of proficiency aviation units should maintain in a premobilization environment. It can be implied that the minimum goal for training proficiency is the company level and therefore company level is the standard set for aviation unit proficiency. However, it can just as easily be implied that battalion level is the desired proficiency level. The current doctrine of employing attack helicopter units as a battalion supports the implication that battalion level proficiency is the desired training objective level in premobilization in order to accomplish their wartime mission.

Additional documents published by FORSCOM also lead to the implication that the desired level of proficiency is at the battalion level. FORSCOM published a memorandum in July 1996 discussing and outlining the concept for USAR attack helicopter battalion rotations at the National Training Center (NTC). The directive established in this memorandum is to have USAR attack helicopter units execute an NTC rotation every other year. These rotations are to be at the battalion level in support of a ground maneuver unit.

Lending further support to this, FORSCOM published an NTC Rotation Schedule. This schedule shows the date a unit is scheduled to execute a rotation, who they support, and at what level the unit will execute the rotation. Both USAR attack battalions are on this schedule and designated to conduct their rotations at the battalion level.

An examination of FORSCOM Reg 350-50-1, Training at the National Training Center, strengthens the implication that USAR attack helicopter units are to be proficient at the battalion level. This regulation states that units will become proficient in the collective skills necessary for success on the battlefield. It also provides a list of events that units must achieve proficiency in prior to deploying to the NTC. One of the required events listed is to conduct combined arms exercises at all levels through battalion level.⁴

The conflicting guidance provided by FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, published FORSCOM memorandums and NTC schedules, and FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-1 present a challenge to USAR attack helicopter units. This conflict has a significant impact on USAR aviation units and their ability to prepare for their wartime mission. How do attack helicopter units establish training plans and balance resources to execute those plans

without a clear understanding of the level of proficiency they are to maintain? How do they adequately prepare, during premobilization, to execute their wartime mission without clear guidance as to what level they are to train to?

Research Question

The purpose of this study is to answer the question: “Can USAR attack helicopter units maintain proficiency at the battalion level?”

Background

To better understand the thesis topic, it is important to have a general understanding of the history and organization of the Army Reserve as well as the role of the Army Reserve as it enters the twenty-first century.

The Army Reserve is the Active Army’s federal reserve force. It traces its origin to 1908, when Congress authorized the establishment of a medical reserve corps that could be ordered to active duty to support the Army. In 1912 Congress authorized an Army Reserve of trained citizen-soldiers, and in 1916 the National Defense Act created the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Once established, the Army Reserve became an immediately valuable resource to the Army. More than 160,000 served on active duty during World War I and more than 200,000 served in World War II. Since World War II, over 390,000 Army Reservists have been activated. This includes activations for Grenada, Panama, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Somalia, and Haiti.⁵

The Army Reserve consists of the Selected Reserve (troop program units and individual mobilization augmentees), the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Retired Reserve, totaling more than 1,000,000 reservists, upon which the President can call when needed. By 1998, the Selected Reserve will have an end strength of 208,000 soldiers.⁶

There are three headquarters in the USAR command structure that provide guidance to the two reserve Component attack battalions.

The Office, Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR), located in Washington at the Pentagon, develops and executes Army Reserve plans, policies and programs; administers USAR personnel, operations and construction funds; and commands the Army Reserve Personnel Center. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR), also serves as the commander of the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).

The USARC, located in Atlanta, commands all continental United States (CONUS) Army Reserve units except for civil affairs and psychological operations units. There are three Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMS) that command and control Reserve units outside the United States.

The 244th Aviation Brigade, headquartered at the Philip H. Sheridan Reserve Center in Chicago, Illinois, commands and controls all Reserve Aviation, minus a military intelligence battalion located in Florida. It is responsible for the peacetime training and resourcing of all USAR aviation units minus the military intelligence battalion. The 244th Aviation Brigade is the only aviation brigade in the USAR and is a Direct Reporting Command (DRC) to the USARC. The Brigade itself did not officially complete its reorganization until January 1996.⁷

There are currently two attack helicopter battalions in the USAR. As a result of the Army Restructuring Initiative (ARI), both battalions were reconfigured from the AH-1 Cobra to the AH-64 Apache beginning in 1993 and ending in 1994. One attack battalion, 8th Battalion, 229th Aviation regiment, is located at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The other attack battalion, 7th Squadron, 6th Cavalry, is located at Conroe, Texas. Both battalions have been assigned to the 244th Aviation Brigade for less than two years.

Both attack battalions have wartrace headquarters different from their peacetime headquarters. Wartrace headquarters approve the attack battalions' Mission Essential Task List (METL) and provide command training guidance to the unit. The attack battalions also participate in training exercises with their wartrace headquarters whenever possible. The 8-229th Aviation Regiment's wartrace headquarters is the 6th Combat Aviation Brigade, Korea. The 7-6th Cavalry Regiment's wartrace headquarters is the 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort. Hood, Texas.

Definition of Terms

There are a variety of terms, phrases and abbreviations used throughout the thesis that require definition to better understand the study. Many are specific to the USAR when discussing resources and training. Key definitions applicable to this study are:

Active Guard Reserve (AGR). Active Guard Reserve personnel are USAR soldiers on active duty assigned to support the unit by organizing, administering, recruiting and retaining, instructing and training the unit.⁸

Additional Drill Assemblies (ADAs). Additional drill assemblies are intended to improve readiness by providing necessary training for soldiers and units to attain and maintain the designated levels of readiness. The periods supplement the 48 regularly scheduled Inactive Duty Training (IDT) assemblies by providing additional time to conduct required activities, such as training, administrative actions, staff supervision of training and readiness and preparation of training. ADAs are used at the commander's discretion to enhance readiness. There are three types of ADAs, Readiness Management Assemblies (RMAs), Additional Training Assemblies (ATAs) and Additional Flight Training Periods (AFTPs).⁹

Additional Flight Training Periods (AFTPs). Paid flight and support AFTPs are provided to aircrew and aviation support personnel. The AFTP program is designed so aircrews and support personnel can maintain the high level of individual and crew skills required to ensure flying safety and meet mobilization readiness objectives. Flight AFTPs are used for aircrew training. Support AFTPs are used only for aircrew member academic and inflight training, completion of written elements of the Annual Proficiency and Readiness Test (APART), completion of the annual aviation medical examination or performance of aviation functions which support successful aircrew operations.¹⁰

Annual Training (AT). Annual training is required during each training year. The minimum time allowed for AT is 14 days, excluding travel. Units may conduct up to 17 days AT each training year, however, this requires additional funding. AT is normally conducted away from home station and is focused on collective training.¹¹

Full-Time Support Personnel (FTUS). The objective of the FTUS program is to improve readiness and mobilization/demobilization planning and preparation by providing Active Guard Reserve (AGR), Active Army, and Federal Civil Service personnel to Reserve units and organizations.¹²

Inactive Duty Training (IDT). Two areas, or types, of IDTs require definition for the study, the Unit Training Assembly (UTA) and Multiple Unit Training Assemblies (MUTA). The UTA is an authorized and scheduled training assembly of at least four hours. Units are limited to no more than 48 UTAs each fiscal year. A MUTA is two or more UTAs conducted consecutively.¹³ Inactive duty training is basically what we consider a drill weekend. The time, or duration, of an IDT can be shortened or lengthen. For the purposes of this research, an IDT is a standard weekend, a Saturday and Sunday, that a soldier trains.

There are two additional terms and phrases that are non-USAR specific that are critical to the study.

The Unit Status Report (USR) provides a timely, single source document for assessing key elements of a unit's status. There are four measured resource areas: personnel; equipment on hand; equipment serviceability; and training. The status of each resource area is assigned a numerical category level. The commander determines an overall unit status level based on a combination of the unit's measured resource area levels and his or her professional judgment.

Both USAR attack battalions are required to maintain an overall status level (C-level) of C-2.¹⁴ Army Regulation 220-1 defines C-2 as: the unit possesses the required

resources and is trained to undertake most of its wartime missions for which it is organized or designed. The unit would require little, if any, compensation for deficiencies. The corresponding training level required of both attack battalions is T-2. This equates to an estimate of fifteen to twenty eight days required to train to standard on tasks in the unit METL.

The primary purpose of the unit training level is to indicate the current ability of the unit to performed assigned wartime missions. When determining the unit's training level, the commander first assesses his unit's ability to execute mission essential tasks. Then the commander estimates the number of training days needed for his unit to achieve full proficiency in mission essential tasks. The estimated number of training days need to reach full proficiency determines the unit's training level.

The USR also provides a means to better define a unit's C-level. Each C-level has a corresponding Mission Accomplishment Estimate (MAE). The primary purpose of the MAE is to provide a more definitive estimate of the ability of a unit to perform its wartime mission. It is the commanders subjective assessment of his unit's ability to execute that portion of his wartime mission it would be expected to perform if alerted/committed.

The corresponding MAE range for C-2 is 89 to 80 percent. Reporting in the 80 - 89 percent range is done when it is estimated that the unit possesses required resources, training, and is in position or has the necessary mobility to undertake most of the full wartime mission for which it has been organized. The status of personnel, equipment, supplies, consumables and unit position do not decrease the probability of mission success or increase the vulnerability of the unit. The unit does not need extraordinary measures or

extensive outside mobility assets to compensate for deficiencies. Though all four resource areas are important, this study will only address training.

Proficiency, for the purpose of this study, is defined as the unit's ability to attain and maintain the required T-level rating on the Unit Status Report. To accomplish this, units must be able to maintain a needs practice (P) rating on all tasks listed in its METL.

Needs practice is define in ARTEP 1-100 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Aviation Brigade and Battalion as, "the element needs to practice the task. All critical subtasks were performed correctly, but one or more noncritical subtasks were performed incorrectly."¹⁵

Assumptions

There are several basic assumptions that must be made in order for this study to be valid. First, attack helicopter battalions will continue to remain in the Reserve Component. The focus of this research is attack battalions in the USAR, however it may be applied to the National Guard units if they have the same resources and constraints.

Second, while some change is expected, there will not be a significant change in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) of the two attack battalions in regard to personnel authorizations and major pieces of equipment.

Third, funding of the attack battalions will remain relatively consistent with that of previous years. This includes the flying hour program of both units.

Fourth, standards established for attack battalions and aircrew training will not change. Only minimum changes in training and administrative requirements will occur.

The primary reason for these changes will be caused by the USARC, with the approval of FORSCOM, moving requirements from premobilization to post mobilization.

Limitations

The main limitation of this thesis is that the USAR has only two AH-64 attack helicopter battalions. Both of these battalions have only had the AH-64 Apache helicopter for a relatively short period of time. This may limit the historical data available. Historical data can be used to show trends which are useful in conducting an analysis.

Delimitations

This thesis will focus on Army Reserve attack helicopter units only and not include the National Guard units. This was done not only to focus the thesis topic but also to avoid contending with specific guidelines issued by each state Adjutant general.

Research Methodology

This study seeks to identify a USAR attack helicopter unit's ability to maintain proficiency at the battalion level primarily using a comparative approach.

The first step will be to establish all requirements that an attack helicopter unit must satisfy. This will include individual, leader, and collective requirements. Administrative requirements will also be addressed because they compete with training requirements in terms of time and personnel.

Next, all resources available to attack helicopter units will be identified and discussed in detail. This will include a breakdown of resources by type and amount, or quantity, available to an individual or unit. It will also identify what resources may be used in conjunction with others and which ones are prohibited from being used together.

The final step will be to compare the requirements placed on the unit with resources available. To accomplish this, a duration, or amount of time, must be assigned to each requirement. Also, events that can be conducted concurrently must be identified. Once this is accomplished, the study will conduct the comparison.

Significance of the Study

Battle focus is a recognition that a unit cannot attain proficiency to standard on every task whether due to time or other resource constraints. Units may achieve a successful training program, however, by narrowing the focus to a reduced number of vital tasks that are essential to mission accomplishment.¹⁶ In order to accomplish this, a unit must clearly understand what standard or level of proficiency it is expected to attain and maintain. Presently, guidance as to what proficiency level aviation units should train to is unclear. A minimum standard is established in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 but other FORSCOM guidance indicates that a higher level of proficiency is required, that being battalion level.

The purpose of the study is to answer the research question, "Can USAR attack helicopter units maintain proficiency at the battalion level." The significance of the study lies in the answer to that question. Research and analysis of requirements placed on a unit

and resources available to the unit will identify shortcomings in a unit's ability to conduct training on all required events in order to achieve the training objective of battalion level proficiency. The study has the potential for being the catalyst that changes the training methodology and philosophy of USAR attack helicopter units. These changes include both premobilization and post mobilization training.

¹ Department of the Army, FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1991), 1-1-1-3.

² Department of the Army, FORSCOM REG 350-2, Reserve Component Training in America's Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1995), 17.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Department of the Army, FORSCOM REG 350-50-1, Training at the National Training Center (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1995), 3.

⁵ Department of Defense, "Fact File: The Army Reserve." [On-line]

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Department of the Army, "Headquarters United States Army Reserve Command Permanent Order F-024-05" (Atlanta, GA: United States Army Reserve Command, January 1996).

⁸ Department of the Army, AR 135-2, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Full-Time Support Program (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1990), 3.

⁹ Department of the Army, AR 140-1, Army Reserve Mission, Organization, and Training (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 1994), 10.

¹⁰ Ibid., 19.

¹¹ Department of the Army, AR 135-200, Army National Guard and Army Reserve Active Duty for Training, Annual Training, and Active Duty for Special Work of Individual Soldiers (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1994), 6.

¹² AR 135-2, 2.

¹³ AR 140-1, 8.

¹⁴ United States Army reserve Command, Tiered Resourcing Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997 (Atlanta, GA: USARC, October 1996).

¹⁵ Department of the Army, ARTEP 1-100-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Aviation Brigade and Battalion (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1990), 5-1.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1988), 1-7.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

In conducting research for this study, the author did not find any sources that were specifically written about the training of USAR attack helicopter units and their ability to maintain proficiency at certain levels. Additional research of previously published Master of Military Art and Science theses on the subject of attack helicopter battalion proficiency levels in the USAR revealed that nothing has been published on this subject to date.

Innumerable documents, books, journals, and periodicals are on library shelves written about the armed services, military history, battles and a variety of other warfighting subjects. Almost every one of the sources listed above addresses the role of training in one form or another. Most address a lack of training and the role this deficiency played in combat and the ability of a unit to fight and win, which is the Army training mission.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss literature relating to the topic, including sources already consulted as well as potential supplemental sources which may aid future research methods. The chapter will also identify gaps that exist in literature as it relates to this study.

This study will present a historical perspective demonstrating the significance of training in two operations, one a failure the other a success. Next, the study will address two articles published that address training problems in the Reserve Component and the

importance of focused training. This will be followed by a review of the publications the Army uses today that lay the foundation for all training conducted in preparation for combat. Finally publications used in direct support of the study will be addressed.

History provides valuable insight on the importance of training. Frederick the Great said, “Unless every man is trained beforehand in peacetime for that which he will have to accomplish in war, one has nothing but people who bear the name of a business without knowing how to practice it.”¹ Frederick held such a strong conviction that “much could be learned through the mistakes of others” that when he became king, he had selections that exposed the mistakes of others in combat read to military cadets at meal time. He distributed copies of these selections to his regiments during the first Silesian war with instructions to read the book with “diligence and meditation.”²

Two pieces of historical literature will be reviewed for this study. First, a review of Air Power: A Concise History by Robin Higham will look at the impact a lack of training, or a lack of focus, can have on the performance of personnel and units in combat. While training in the armed services has greatly progressed since World War I, the example found in Higham’s work is still applicable today. For the most part, aviation training up to and during the First World War was primitive. At worst case, pilots might be sent into action with as few as seventeen hours of flying time; they were easy victims. In the better organizations and as training was improved and standardized, pilots were given some fifty hours of instruction.³ This included both air and ground training. Training often lacked focus because leaders at the time were unsure how to employ aviation. The emphasis was upon learning to fly; employment on maneuvers was largely limited to primitive tactical

reconnaissance. Because the training staff was not proficient in combat operations, they stuck to peacetime concepts and rules.⁴ Because of the inadequate training, the failure to set and achieve appropriate standards, many pilots died when sent forward into combat. A single day's loss of aircraft could be as high as 23 percent in squadrons engaged in low altitude work; on 8 August 1918 the Royal Air Force lost forty-five aircraft over the front lines and fifty-two wrecked or damaged on landing. Wastage in aircraft in Britain ran 66 percent per month.⁵

In The "Truscott Trot": Training for Operation Husky, 1943, Stephen Coats examines the 3d Division's rigorous, focused training program that prepared it for combat in Sicily. This writing provides an excellent example of how a commander, because of limited preparation time, focused his training on selected critical tasks which proved to be a key reason for the success of his unit in combat.

Major General Truscott assumed command of the 3d Division approximately four months before it was scheduled to participate in Operation Husky. As he assessed the condition of the Division, he believed that a sort of "rear area" feeling had overcome the Division. He maintained that the Division's attitude toward training lacked the fire and intensity which he had hoped to find in a division which might be called upon to fight at any time.⁶ This "rear area" feeling Major General Truscott identified in 1943 can be equated to a similar feeling experienced in many units today. The feeling today that "we will never go to war" is a challenge that commanders must overcome.

Truscott evaluated the mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available in developing a focused training plan. In addition to his evaluation, he relied on his

experiences working with the British Commandos and the U.S. Rangers and his observations of the impact rigorous training had on preparing them for combat. Truscott also realized the significance of setting unrealistic goals and standards. He observed: "I realized that I would have to approach the objective gradually. To prescribe such standards for an entire infantry division and then fail to attain them would cause lack of confidence, effect command relations, and be generally harmful. Officers and men would have to be imbued with the importance of such preparation and with the confidence in their ability to attain it."⁷ To better focus the Division's training, Truscott had his staff scrutinize over the initial Husky plan to ensure a full understanding of the essential tasks that must be accomplished for mission success. The extensive training the 3d Division conducted on focused goals and essential tasks resulted in the Division achieving extraordinary results in Sicily.

Truscott's ability to focus his training plan on tasks he considered essential prepared the 3d Division for combat. From years of personal experience, education, and observation, he was convinced that the Army's "tactical principles and training methods were sound." Most difficulties were due to "faulty execution and inadequate standards."⁸ In other words, most difficulties are attributed to a unit's ability to focus on essential tasks and train to established standards.

Books and Articles

The books and articles discussed in this chapter help define this study's analysis of the primary research question and demonstrate the importance of this work in addressing the area of attack helicopter training in the Army Reserves.

Roundout Brigades: Ready or Not? by Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Stouder addresses problems concerning Army National Guard (ARNG) readiness. It addresses two specific questions, "Can the ARNG ever achieve the same readiness levels of the Active Component?" and "Does the Army ask too much of the ARNG?". While Lieutenant Colonel Stouder's article focuses on combat arms units in the ARNG, the questions asked and the discussion presented in this article can be applied to all Reserve Components but have a direct relevance to the attack battalions in the USAR..

Stouder's article is intended to highlight the systemic problems that subvert combat readiness of the ARNG.⁹ He bases his discussion on three major studies published on the subject.

1. Department of the Army Inspector General, Special Assessment of the National Guard Brigade's Mobilization, June 1991.
2. General Accounting Office (GAO), National Guard: Peacetime Training Did not adequately prepare Combat Brigades for the Gulf War, September 1991.
3. Congressional Research Service, The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, 22 October 1991.

All three reports looked at premobilization training in different levels of detail and drew similar conclusions. All three studies cited similar systemic problems which are summarized as follows:

1. Lack of individual, leader, and crew skill proficiency.
2. Lack of maintenance training at all levels, from drivers to supervisors, from battalion maintenance section to forward support battalion.
3. Lack of realistic training, especially force-on-force, night, and chemical training.
4. Lack of leadership skills throughout the chain of command.
5. Overstated unit status reports.
6. Training plans that understated the number of postmobilization training days by as much as three times the number actually required.¹⁰

Stouder's explanation of several of the findings listed above are important to the study. First, he addresses the issue of time and its effect on the above findings. He begins by asking the question, "Considering today's high-technology weapon systems and the complex nature of combined arms warfare, are 39 days a year enough to prepare the ARNG soldiers for war?"¹¹ This question is of significant importance to the attack helicopter unit which is equipped with aircraft using the most up-to-date and advanced technology the Army has in its inventory. Stouder's comparison of the time available for training to the ARNG, 39 days, and to the Active Component, an average of 120 battalion collective training days, is also significant.¹² While the 39 days he uses as a reference point may be an oversimplification, it serves as a baseline to demonstrate the difficulties

the Reserve Components have in executing training and maintaining a standard of readiness comparable to the Active Component.

Second, Stouder identifies individual and leader skill decay as the biggest challenge for battalion commanders. This has a direct impact on the units ability to train at the collective level. TRADOC and the USAIS have studied skill decay and have concluded that we must design training to sustain skill proficiency.¹³ Skill decay plays a significant role in the unit's ability to train at the collective level.

Third, leaders are not proficient at the required skill level to plan and conduct training. This is one contributing factor to the poor training often conducted during IDT. This training is designed to be the stepping stones a unit builds on to have a successful AT. Before one hour of collective training can be productive, each soldier and leader must be proficient on individual tasks associated with that collective task. In football, if linemen cannot pass block, the team cannot execute a pass play. The same principle applies to military training.¹⁴ Without successful and productive IDT periods, unit ATs will be unproductive and fail to prepare the unit for combat.

Major General Petrosky, Commander of the Army Aviation Center, addresses the issue of aviation readiness in his article Battle Focused Aviation Training, published in the August-September 1997 issue of the Army Aviation magazine. Major General Petrosky stresses the importance of a commander's ability to selectively identify those tasks that are essential to accomplishing their unit's wartime mission. Success cannot occur if a commander doesn't understand "what right looks like." Their training strategy must remain focused while simultaneously providing optimum expenditure of resources.¹⁵

Government Documents

Today, the Army has two field manuals that lay the foundation for all training conducted in preparation for combat. FM 25-100, Training the Force is the foundation for training in the U.S. Army. This includes both the Active and Reserve Components.

Training the Force is the Army's standardized training doctrine applicable throughout the force.¹⁶ It provides guidance on planning, executing and assessing training at all levels.

The primary focus of the manual is on battalion and higher level commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs. This is the doctrine every senior leader is expected to know and apply.

FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, builds on the doctrine establish in FM 25-100. It clearly identifies training as the Army's top priority. "Training is the Army's top priority; it prepares us to fight. As leaders, our sacred responsibility is to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained."¹⁷

While Training the Force is focused at the battalion or higher level, Battle Focused Training is oriented toward the leadership of battalions and below. It is designed to assist these leaders in developing and executing training programs. Battle Focused Training provides practical "how to" guidelines for officers and Noncommissioned Officers, including techniques and procedures for planning, executing, and assessing training.¹⁸

The relative importance the Army places on training is evident when reviewing the course syllabus of the Army's Command and General Staff College core curriculum class entitled Leadership. A description of the course included in the scope paragraph states that "Students will evaluate situations and design programs to increase unit effectiveness.

These programs will include emphasis on leadership, training, legal considerations, and dealing with the media.”¹⁹ It goes on to state “The centerpiece of these lessons is the development of a training strategy which represents the commanders statement of strategy. Throughout the text and course, emphasis is placed on a leader’s ability to focus a unit by use of the commander’s philosophy, vision, and training strategy. The course instruction consists of a total of 68 hours, 41 of which are directly related to training. An additional eight hours are indirectly related to training by establishing the foundation upon which the training modules are built.

A review of additional government literature failed to identify any documents or publications that specifically address the subject of training, attack helicopter training, and training in the Reserves. The United States Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama has issued an After Action Report for Operation Desert Shield/Storm that addresses the training readiness of attack battalions but it does not specifically address Reserve units and their readiness. General Schwarzkopf also addresses the Reserve Component in his Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report. However, he provides an overview which does not focus on specific training deficiencies or strengths of units. While FORSCOM REG 350-2 does address training proficiency level of different type units (combat, combat support, and combat service support). No document researched, however, addresses the areas of the Reserves, attack helicopter battalions, and training proficiency level in detail as they relate to one another.

Publications used in Direct Support of the Study

In the research of this study, several key publications were used as the main sources for data. These publications can be categorized as those identifying requirements and those identifying resources available to units.

General requirements that pertain to all units are AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training, and USARC Training Guidance for Fiscal Year 1998 and 1999.

Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, establishes the unit status report system. It explains in detail what units are required to report, how reports are prepared, and how reports are submitted. It provides specific guidance for determining the units status, or readiness, by comparing selected personnel, equipment, and training factors to wartime requirements.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training, identifies requirements and standards for aerial gunneries and individual weapons qualification. It provides specific guidance on the frequency of training and qualification requirements as well as how those requirements can be met.

USARC Training Guidance is issued covering a two-year period. Its purpose is to provide Yearly Training Guidance (YTG) to all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) and USARC installations for Training Years (TY) 1998 and 1999. This training guidance identifies training priorities and requirements and addresses selected resource priorities.

Aviation specific requirements are found in ARTEP 1-385-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Attack Helicopter Battalion, and FM 1-140, Helicopter Gunnery. DA PAM 350-38 also has a chapter dedicated solely to aerial gunnery for helicopters.

The Mission Training Plan (MTP) for the Attack Helicopter Battalion, ARTEP 1-385-MTP is designed for all attack helicopter battalions, both active and reserve, and subordinate elements. The missions described in the MTP are the principle ones that attack units are expected to execute to a high degree of proficiency. The MTP provides a descriptive, mission-oriented program for use in training attack battalions to perform their critical wartime missions. This training program is depicted in the form of a Maneuver Training Strategy and Gunnery Training Strategy. The Maneuver Training Strategy provides a listing of events and the frequency in which they should be conducted in order for a unit to be combat ready. The Gunnery Training Strategy compliments DA PAM 350-38. Like the Maneuver Training Strategy, it provides a desired frequency for conducting aerial gunnery qualification with the intent of building and sustaining combat ready units. The MTP also provide an evaluation program for attack helicopter battalions.

Field Manual 1-140, Helicopter Gunnery, provides the details for the actual conduct and execution of aerial gunnery training and qualification. It presents a timeline or sequence of events for attack battalions to follow when conducting aerial gunnery qualification.

The primary publication used in this study to identify resources available to Reserve aviation units is AR 140-1, Reserve Components Mission, Organization, and Training.

This regulation defines and identifies allocations of resources available to USAR units. It is also the primary source document for defining terms specific to the reserve Component.

Summary

This chapter demonstrated the importance of training and its impact on a unit's ability to accomplish its wartime mission. The two examples taken from history clearly demonstrate how training impacts a unit's ability to succeed in combat. Looking specifically at a Reserve Component in a recent conflict, The Gulf War, LTC Stouder in his article, "Roundout Brigades: Ready or Not", provides an excellent overview of the problem and challenges that face combat arms units in the ARNG. The factors he identifies that have an impact on combat readiness, such as high technology weapons and limited training days, can be directly applied to the USAR and attack helicopter units.

The Army's current training doctrine as presented in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101 is very clearly defined. Units must focus their training efforts on critical tasks. They cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on all possible soldier, leader, and collective tasks. Both manuals address how units focus their efforts by developing mission essential task lists. Both manuals clearly state that the purpose of having a METL is so they can be proficient in those tasks that are critical to mission accomplishment. What is not clearly addressed is how units define proficiency. Also, as identified in chapter 1, there is unclear guidance as to what training level units should attain proficiency. Neither Field Manual nor the attack helicopter battalion MTP provides a definition of what a proficient unit is. What this study

will accomplish is to provide a definition of proficiency, as it relates to USAR attack helicopter units and their ability to attain proficiency at the battalion level.

¹ R.R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age ed, Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 99.

² Jay Luvas, "Frederick the Great: The Education of a Great Captain," The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures in Military Leadership and Command 1986 ed, Henry S. Bausum (Lexington VA: The VMI Foundation, 1986) pp. 23-37; excerpt reprinted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, C610 Syllabus/Book of Readings (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1997), 75.

³ Robin Higham, Air Power: A Concise History (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1988), 10.

⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁶ Stephen D. Coates, "The "Truscott Trot": Training for Operation Husky, 1943." in Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939 ed, Roger J. Spiller (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 278.

⁷ Ibid., 279.

⁸ Ibid., 281.

⁹ Richard L. Stouder, "Roundout Brigades: Ready or Not?" Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1993), 39.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 40.

¹³ Ibid., 41.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Daniel J. Petrosky, "Battle Focused Aviation Training." Army Aviation (Westport, CT: Army Aviation Publications, Inc., August-September 1997), 12.

¹⁶ Department of the Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 1988), i.

¹⁷ FM25-101, Forward.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Department of the Army, C700, Leadership (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1997), 1.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter identifies the specific research methodology to be used and presents the data that the study will use in the analysis conducted in chapter 4. The study intends to answer the research question, "Can USAR attack helicopter units maintain proficiency at the battalion level?", by comparing resources available to the units with requirements placed on the units. The first step in this process is to identify and provide a detailed discussion of the resources available to a unit. These resources include personnel strength standards, military occupational specialty qualification standards, aircraft maintenance standards, attendance standards for IDT and AT, and the time available to the unit for training. While it is acknowledged that the availability of all resources has an impact on a unit's ability to train and maintain proficiency, the focus of this study is on the time available to units to conduct training.

The next step is to identify and provide a discussion on the training requirements placed on the unit. This includes individual, leader, and collective training requirements. The study will also identify administrative requirements placed on a unit. The primary focus of this study is on training but the study will only be valid to the extent that it acknowledges that other requirements compete for training time available to the unit.

The final steps are to conduct the comparison and an analysis of this information. This will be accomplished in chapter 4.

Requirements

Attack helicopter units, regardless of component, are expected to maintain a level of proficiency that enables them to deploy, fight and win. To this end, Reserve Component units are required to meet the same training requirements and standards as the Active Component.

A variety of documents establish training requirements that units must accomplish and the frequency at which they must be executed. This study uses three primary sources for identifying individual training requirements that the battalions must execute.

FORSCOM REG 350-2, Reserve Component Training in America's Army, sets forth FORSCOM policy for training in the Reserve Component. It establishes goals, objectives and training principles for Reserve units. DA PAM 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training contains policy and procedures for planning, resourcing and executing training. It includes weapons qualification standards and suggested training programs for the attainment and sustainment of weapons proficiency. Training guidance published by the USARC, the battalions' wartrace headquarters, and the 244th Aviation Brigade all provide additional guidance for planning and conducting training within the battalions.

Table 1 is a compilation of the individual requirements that units must execute. It identifies the event, frequency and source document establishing this as a requirement. Events identified as requirements in DA PAM 350-38 are for premobilization only. While the units may have additional equipment or weapons, if they are not identified as resourced for premobilization training, they are not listed in this study. The table

Table 1. Individual Requirements

Event	Frequency	Reference
M16 NBC Practice	Biennial	DA PAM 350-38
M16 NBC Record		DA PAM 350-38
M16 Night Practice		DA PAM 350-38
M16 Night Record		DA PAM 350-38
M203 Zero		DA PAM 350-38
M203 Qualification		DA PAM 350-38
M60 Transition Zero/Practice		DA PAM 350-38
M60 Transition Record		DA PAM 350-38
M60 Night Zero/Prac/Record		DA PAM 350-38
CTT		FORSCOM REG 350-2
M16 Zero	Annual	DA PAM 350-38
M16 Practice Fire		DA PAM 350-38
M16 Record Fire		DA PAM 350-38
M203 Night Record		DA PAM 350-38
M60 10 Meter Zero/Practice		DA PAM 350-38
M60 10 Meter Record		DA PAM 350-38
M2 Gunner's Exam		DA PAM 350-38
M2 10 Meter Zero/Prac		DA PAM 350-38
M2 10 Meter record		DA PAM 350-38

Table 1 (continued). Individual Requirements

Event	Frequency	Reference
M9 Instructional Fire	Annual	DA PAM 350-38
M9 Qualification		DA PAM 350-38
M18A1 Employment Instruction Qual		DA PAM 350-38
Class A Inspection		AR 710-2, AR 700-84
Mobilization Brief		FORSCOM REG 350-3
OPSEC Brief		AR 350-1
SAEDA Brief		AR 350-1
Standards of Conduct		AR 600-50
UCMJ Brief		FORSCOM REG 350-2
ALSE Brief		AR 95-1
Safety Brief		AR 95-1
APFT		FORSCOM REG 350-2
Weather Brief	Semiannual	AR 95-1

provides a breakdown of events by the frequency in which they are required. The three categories of frequency of event are biennial, annual, and semiannual.

Primary sources for identifying unit, or collective, training requirements are the Attack Battalion MTP, DA PAM 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training, FORSCOM REG 350-2, Reserve Component Training in America's Army, and training guidance published by the USARC, the battalions' wartrace headquarters, and the 244th Aviation

Brigade. Table 2 is a listing of unit level requirements that exist. The table also identifies the frequency the event is required to occur and the source document establishing it as a requirement.

The Attack Helicopter Battalion MTP provides a training strategy for attack helicopter units. This strategy establishes the frequency of events that a unit should conduct in order to maintain proficiency.¹ It is assumed that the events will be spaced evenly throughout the training year and that some events may be conducted simultaneously. An example of this would be a company conducting a situational training exercise while the battalion conducts a command post exercise. The MTP developed the strategy for both the Active and Reserve Component. For the purpose of this study, only the Reserve Component strategy is discussed. This strategy is reflected in table 3.

The Attack Helicopter Battalion MTP also identifies a Gunnery Training Strategy for attack units. This strategy conforms to guidance published in DA PAM 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training. Table 4 shows this recommended strategy.

Resources

All resources available to a unit play a role in that unit's ability to plan and conduct training. For the purpose of this study, only two resource areas, because of their direct impact on the study, will be addressed. These two resources are time and training areas.

Table 2. Unit Requirements

Event	Frequency	Reference
Organizational Inspection Program	Biennial	USARC PAM 20-1 Aviation Brigade OIP SOP
Avn Resource Management Survey		Aviation Brigade OIP SOP
Command Inspection (Battalion)		USARC PAM 20-1 Aviation Brigade OIP SOP
Lane Training	Annual	FORSCOM REG 350-2
Inactive Duty Training (IDT)		
Annual Training (AT)		
Battle Command and Staff Training		FORSCOM REG 350-2
Threat Training		FORSCOM REG 350-3
Aerial Gunnery		DA PAM 350-38
Table V, HGST		
Table VI, Calibration		
Table VII, Crew		
Table VIII, Crew		
Aircraft Survivability Equipment Training		AR 95-1
Mobilization Site Visit		FORSCOM REG 350-3
Officer Professional Development NCO Professional Development	Monthly	Brigade Training Guidance

Table 3. Maneuver Training Strategy

Event	Crew	Platoon	Company	Battalion	Remarks
Drill	48	Monthly			At least 1 Drill per AFTP - 48 AFTPs Annually
Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT)			1	1	May be conducted during STAFEX or TOCEX
Map Exercise			1	1	
STF SEC TNG				4	
TOC Exercise				1	
Staff Exercise				2	May be conducted in LIEU of STF SEC TNG
Command Post Exercise				1	
Fire Coordination Exercise				1	May be conducted in LIEU of FTX
Situational Training Exercise		6	6		
Logistics Command Exercise				1	
Command Field Exercise				.5	Conduct every 2 years
Deployment Exercise			2	2	May be part of FTX, CTC, or JTX
Field Training Exercise			2	2	
External Evaluation or Combat Training Center			.5	.5	Conduct every 2 years
Joint Training Exercise			.5	.5	Conduct every 2 years

Source: ARTEP 1-385-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Attack Helicopter Battalion

Note: Numbers indicate annual requirement

Table 4. Gunnery Training Strategy

Event	Indiv	Crew	Remarks
Commander's initial evaluation	1		Conduct in Combat Mission Simulator
Weapons calibration/verification		1	Conduct Helicopter Gunnery Skills Test prior to live fire
Live fire training		1	
Live fire qualification		1	

Source: ARTEP 1-385-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Attack Helicopter Battalion

Note: Numbers indicate annual requirement

While Active Component units have the benefit of conducting training throughout the year, Reserve Component units are limited in the amount of time they have to train. Reserve units have two basic unit training periods available to them. These are the Inactive Duty Training (IDT) which is commonly referred to as Drill and Annual Training.

There are two types of IDT that apply to this study, the Unit Training Assembly (UTA) and the Multiple Unit training Assembly (MUTA). The UTA is an authorized and scheduled training assembly of at least four hours, including roll call and rest periods. This assembly is required for all TPUs. A MUTA is two or more UTAs conducted consecutively. MUTAs are typically scheduled over a weekend. No more than two UTAs are conducted per day. Conducting consecutive UTAs and MUTAs make it possible to have a MUTA 2 in one day, a MUTA 3, or a MUTA 4 in two days, and a MUTA 5 or MUTA 6 in three days. When a MUTA is scheduled for a calendar day, each UTA must

be of equal duration. Troop program units will conduct no more than forty eight UTAs each fiscal year.²

Commanders are authorized to schedule family oriented training activities during IDT. These activities are limited to eight hours each year.³

The other basic training period available to Reserve units is Annual Training (AT). Units will serve on AT at least fourteen days (exclusive of travel time) during each training year. The day of arrival and the day of departure from the training site are days of training. A portion of each of the arrival and departure days must be devoted to training. CONUS based units or individuals will not serve more than seventeen days AT each year without prior approval of the CG, USARC. Both of the last two years, however, this approval has been delegated down one level to subordinate commanders to allow individuals to serve up to twenty nine days of AT per year.⁴

Additional Drill Assembly (ADA). Additional training opportunities or planning time is available in the form of Additional Drill Assemblies (ADAs). ADAs are intended to improve unit readiness. These periods supplement the forty eight regularly scheduled IDT assemblies by providing additional time to conduct required activities such as training and administrative actions. ADAs are used at the commander's discretion to enhance readiness. ADAs are authorized for use by both USAR attack helicopter battalions. ADAs are distributed to units on an annual basis. The number of ADAs a unit receives may vary from year to year. There are three types of ADA IDT periods, Readiness Management Assemblies (RMA), Additional Flight Training Periods (AFTP), and Additional Training Assemblies (ATA).⁵

The use of RMAs are intended for those tasks that must be accomplished to sustain unit operations. They are a tool a battalion can use to clear the desk of requirements to make maximum use of training time. RMAs must be a minimum of four hours and no more than one RMA will be performed by an individual in one calendar day. A RMA cannot be performed on the same day in conjunction with any other type assembly. RMAs are only used when sufficient full-time support personnel are not available to accomplish required tasks and RMAs will not be used to conduct training. No more than twenty four RMAs will be performed by any one individual per year.⁶

Additional Training Assemblies are used to conduct additional wartime or assigned mission training. An ATA will be a minimum of four hours. No more than twelve ATAs will be performed by any one individual per year.⁷

Specific rules apply when combining AT or ADT with IDT for individuals or units. These rules are listed below.

1. Only one AT or ADT period will be used in combinations with any IDT tour of duty. Example of this are: AT with a UTA or MUTA at either the beginning or end and ADT prior to or following a MUTA or UTA.
2. Use of IDT periods to travel to or from AT sites other than home station is prohibited.
3. Only MUSARC Commanders may authorize the use of AT or ADT combined with IDT to perform duty at the soldier's home station.
4. AT or ADT will not be used to provide travel time to home station to attend an IDT assembly.⁸

Another important tool available to the commander is the AFTP. AFTPs allow the unit to conduct training at the individual and collective level that may not be accomplished during a normal IDT period. The AFTP is provided to aircrew and support personnel so they can maintain the high level of individual and crew skills required to ensure flying safety and meet mobilization readiness objectives. Each AFTP must be a minimum of four hours, exclusive of travel time. There are two types of AFTPs. Flight AFTPs are conducted in an aircraft or simulator and must average at least 1.5 flight hours with a minimum time flown of 0.1 flight hours. Support AFTPs require no flight time nor are they averaged with flight AFTPs. Individual AFTP performance is limited to two AFTPs per day. Flight and support AFTPs may be combined with single UTAs, or ATAs. They may not be combined with their multiples or with RMAs, AT, or ADT days. No more than one third of the annual flight AFTP authorization, rounded to the next whole number, may be used in any one fiscal quarter. Exceptions to this can be requested in writing on a case-by-case basis.⁹ Table 5 shows the annual allocations of AFTPs for each MOS authorized use of this training period.

Available training areas and the location of these areas play an important role in a Reserve unit's ability to train. The distance a unit has to travel and the time it takes to get to the training area has a direct impact on the time available to train. This has minimum impact on one battalion but is a significant consideration for the other battalion.

Table 5. Additional Flight Training Period Annual Authorizations

Category	Flight	Support	Total
Rated Aviators			
FAC 1	48	6	48
FAC 2	48	6	48
FAC 3	48	6	48
Non-rated Personnel			
Attack Helicopter CE	0	24	24
Helicopter Repairer	0	12	12
Flight Operations Specialist	0	12	12
Technical Inspector	0	12	12
ALSE Technician	0	12	12
Aircraft Armament Technician	0	12	12
Aircraft Fire Control Specialist	0	12	12
Petroleum Specialist	0	12	12
Flight Platoon Sergeant	0	12	12
Aviation Maintenance Supervisor	0	12	12
Avionics Technician	0	12	12
Aviation Electronics Technician	0	12	12
Ammunition Specialist	0	12	12

Source: AR 140-1, Army Reserve Mission, Organization, and Training

The 8-229th Aviation Regiment is located on Fort Knox in Kentucky. This is an active duty military reservation with numerous training areas available to units. This includes individual weapons ranges and aerial gunnery ranges. There is also adequate space for the unit to conduct a field training exercise in a tactical field environment.

The 7-6th Cavalry Squadron is located in Conroe, Texas. The nearest military reservation available to 7-6th Cavalry Squadron for training is Fort Hood, Texas. This is approximately a two-hour flight by helicopter and a six hour drive by tactical vehicle. For the purposes of this study, when discussing training areas, it is assumed that if 7-6th Cavalry Squadron can meet training requirements, then 8-229th Aviation Regiment, who is less constrained by access to training areas, can also meet training requirements.

Summary

This chapter laid the foundation for the analysis conducted in chapter 4. It accomplished this by first identifying training requirements placed on the unit. Numerous sources provided both individual and collective training requirements and the frequency they are required to be conducted. The Attack Helicopter Battalion MTP also provided a maneuver training strategy developed at the Army Aviation Center at Fort. Rucker. Collective training event frequencies outlined in this strategy are intended to keep a unit proficient in its wartime mission.

Next, the time available to the unit to train was identified and discussed. Among the different time resources available to the unit, three are of primary use to the unit for the actual conduct of training. These are the IDT, AT, and AFTP.

Now that the requirements and resources have been identified, the next steps are to conduct the comparison and analysis of these two. This will be accomplished chapter 4.

¹ Department of the Army, ARTEP 1-385-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Attack Helicopter Battalion (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1995), A-8.

² Department of the Army, AR 140-1, Army Reserve Mission, Organization, and Training (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1994), 8.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁵ Ibid., 10.

⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 20.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 4 is an analysis of the data presented in chapter 3. Three steps are followed in the analysis process. First, a duration of time is assigned against each requirement as listed in chapter 3. The time assigned an event is at the battalion level. For example, if it requires one hour to conduct the semiannual weather brief and the battalion delegates the responsibility of conducting the brief down to company level, it does not now become a five hour requirement.

Next, events that can occur concurrently and grouped together will be identified. One example of grouping two events together is the deployment exercise and the field training exercise. The battalion schedules and conducts a deployment exercise as a lead in to a battalion field training exercise. Events such as M16 zero fire, practice fire, and qualification will be grouped and considered one event. Both attack battalions reflect this as M16 qualification on training schedules.

The final step is the comparison of the time required to conduct an event and the time available to the unit to execute training. This will enable the study to conduct the required analysis to determine if units have adequate time to conduct required training events in order to maintain proficiency at the battalion level.

Time Requirements

The time required to execute training is not limited to the time required for execution of the event alone. It also encompasses the time required to plan and coordinate for the event and the time required to recover or conduct post operation checks and services after the event. Planning and recovery times will be addressed after the events that can occur concurrently are identified.

The time identified for conducting each required event is depicted in table 6 (Individual Requirements), table 7 (Unit Requirements), and table 8 (Maneuver Training Strategy). The times assigned to each event are derived from the attack helicopter battalion and air cavalry troop MTPs, FORSCOM REG 350-2, FM 1-140, and historical data from both attack battalions. Times assigned an event are listed in terms of hours or days. A standard day equates to eight hours. This is in line with the minimum time required to conduct a UTA and MUTA. A review and tabulation of tables 6, 7 and 8 provide the total time requirements placed on a battalion in one year. Table 4-1, Individual Requirements, shows an annual requirement of eight days; table 7, Unit Requirements, identifies a requirement of twenty five days; and table 8, Maneuver Training Strategy, has a requirement of 25.5 days. The total of these three tables indicates that total time required to conduct battalion training in one year is 58.5 days.

While FORSCOM REG 350-2 stipulates that units are required to evaluate CTT on an biennial basis, it also says units should train on CTT annually. This study assumes that each unit executes CTT training as concurrent training during other scheduled events.

Table 6. Training Time - Individual Requirements

Event	Frequency	Time Required to Execute
M16 NBC Practice/Record	Biennial	1 day
M16 Night Practice/Record		1 day
M203 Zero/Qualification		1 day
M60 Transition Zero/Practice/Record		4 hours
M60 Night Zero/Prac/Record		1 day
CTT		1 day
M16 Zero/Practice/Record	Annual	2 days
M203 Night Record		4 hours
M60 10 Meter Zero/Practice/Record		1 day
M2 Gunner's Exam		4 hours
M2 10 Meter Zero/Practice/Record		4 hours
M9 Instructional Fire/Qualification		1 day
M18A1 Employment Instruction Qual		4 hours
Class A Inspection		2 hours
Mobilization Brief		1 hour
OPSEC Brief		1 hour
SAEDA Brief		1 hour
Standards of Conduct		1 hour
UCMJ Brief		1 hour
ALSE Brief		1 hour
Safety Brief		1 hour
APFT		4 hours
Weather Brief	Semiannual	2 hour

Table 7. Training Time - Unit Requirements

Event	Frequency	Time Required to Execute
Organizational Inspection Program	Biennial	2.5 days
Avn Resource Management Survey		3 days
Command Inspection (Battalion)		2 days
Lane Training	Annual	
Inactive Duty Training (IDT)		2 days
Annual Training (AT)		5 days
Battle Command and Staff Training		2.5 days
Threat Training		4 hours
Aerial Gunnery		
Table V, HGST		1 hour
Table VI, Calibration		12 days
Table VII, Crew		
Table VIII, Crew		
Aircraft Survivability Equipment Training		2 hours
Mobilization Site Visit		1 day
Officer Professional Development	Monthly	1 hour per month
NCO Professional Development		Total: 12 hours

An example is conducting CTT training at a weapons qualification range as concurrent training. This keeps the CTT requirement as a biennial event.

Inspections identified as a biennial requirement are not included in this time.

Biennial inspections are designed to complement each other in off years. In other words,

Table 8. Training Time - Maneuver Training Strategy

Event	Crew	Platoon	Company	Battalion	Time Required
Drill	48	Monthly			96 hrs (12 days) conducted during AFTPs
Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT)			1	1	1 day per exercise, Total: 1 day
Map Exercise			1	1	2 days per exercise, Total: 2 days
STF SEC TNG				4	Total: 4 days
TOC Exercise				1	Total: 2 days
Staff Exercise				2	2 days per exercise, Total: 4 days
Command Post Exercise				1	Total: 2 days
Fire Coordination Exercise				1	Total: 2.5 days
Situational Training Exercise (STX)		6	6		PLT: 5.5 hours per STX Co: 10.5 hours per STX s Total: 96 hours (12 days)
Logistics Command Exercise				1	Total: 1 day
Command Field Exercise				.5	Total: 2.5 days every other year
Deployment Exercise			2	2	1 day per exercise Total: 2 days
Field Training Exercise			2	2	2.5 days per event Total: 5 days
External Evaluation or Combat Training Center (CTC)			.5	.5	Total: 14 days at CTC (Co and Bn execute together)
Joint Training Exercise			.5	.5	Total: 14 days (Co and Bn execute together)

Note: Numbers indicate annual requirement

one year a unit undergoes an Aviation Resource Management Survey and a Command Inspection, the next year it undergoes an Organizational Inspection. This would equate to approximately three days a year toward inspections. This brings the total time required to 61.5 days.

Units are authorized eight hours annually for family activities. Both units historically use this time each year for this purpose. This study considers the time authorized to units for family activities as a requirement. It is identified as a requirement rather than lost time because it can be considered when discussing concurrent training opportunities. The eight hours authorized for this activity is the equivalent of one training day for the battalion. When factoring this into the time requirements, this brings the total time requirements to 62.5 days.

An additional factor that must be discussed is the planning and preparation time required to conduct an event and the post operation checks and services conducted after an event. Both are important to the success of the training event and both are time consuming. For most events, the full time staff plans and coordinates requirements. They also perform post operation functions such as documentation and completing formal after action reports. Additional planning is conducted by soldiers when performing duty while executing RMAs and ADAs as discussed earlier in the study.

The field training exercise is an event that the full time staff cannot adequately prepare for on its own. Both units conduct their annual training (AT) in a field environment. This involves a deployment, conducting the exercise, and redeployment. Distances vary for the deployment from AT to AT. Annual training is the major yearly

event for both units. It is similar to an active unit conducting a rotation at one of the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTC). Field Manual 25-101 provides an example timeline of a unit preparing for a CTC rotation. This example stipulates that deployment is the only scheduled major activity for three months, for the Reserve Component, prior to the CTC rotation. Using this timeline has a significant impact on the time available to a unit. The timeline only addresses the preparation for the event. It does not address the time a unit should use conducting post operations checks and services after the event.

For the purpose of this study, one IDT period before and one period after the AT field exercise will be considered for use as deployment prep and post operations checks and services. This is based on historical data from both attack helicopter battalions. This places an additional requirement of four days, two before and two after AT, on the unit. Adding this planning and recovery period to the total time requirements identified raises the total time requirements placed on a unit to 66.5 days.

Concurrent Training

Many of the events identified in the attack helicopter battalion MTP can be conducted concurrently. The next step is to identify these events.

The MTP lists events that can be conducted concurrently thus significantly reducing the time requirement place on a unit. These events are discussed below.

Deployment exercises provide training for soldiers and units in the tasks and procedures required to deploy the unit from home station to a designated area. The scope of the exercise can vary based on the commander's intent, resources and training

objectives. The complexity of a deployment exercise can range from a full-scale exercise that includes the movement of equipment and personnel to a coordination exercise in which no equipment or personnel are moved. The coordination exercise may be as simple as just executing a telephonic recall and accountability of personnel. Deployment exercises can be conducted as the lead-in to the field training exercise. This allows the unit to go through its deployment procedures or SOP and actually move personnel and equipment to a tactical environment. By combining the deployment exercise with the field training exercise, units are able to reduce the requirement placed on them time by two days.

Lanes training is a technique used to train on individual and collective tasks. A lane can range from react to sniper fire to conduct a route reconnaissance. FORSCOM REG 350-2 directs units to conduct Lanes training during their AT period. Historically, both battalions conduct AT as a field training exercise. The battalions have also been directed to conduct AT as a field exercise in training guidance provided by the 244th Aviation Brigade, their peacetime higher headquarters. By conducting Lanes during AT, as directed, and by conducting AT as a field training exercise, again as directed, the battalion is able to combine these two events. This enables the battalion to roll-up the five day lane requirement into the FTX requirement. Conducting these two events concurrently provides a decrease in time requirements of five days.

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) develops leaders within the unit in operations, command and control, decision making and staff work. The focus is on wartime training and not day to day activities and functions.¹ The staff exercise identified

in the MTP, which is designed to develop the staff's ability to execute wartime functions can be combined with the BCTP. Combining two staff exercise with the BCTP reduces the time required to train by two days.

Map Exercises (MAPEX) are low-cost, low-overhead training exercises that portray tactical situations on maps and overlays. They allow the commander to train his staff on essential command and control functions and decision making under simulated wartime conditions. The Command Post Exercises (CPX) is a medium-cost, medium-overhead training exercise that is conducted in garrison or in the field. When conducted in garrison, CPXs are expanded Map Exercises (MAPEX) using communications systems and personnel in a command post environment.² The CPX, like the MAPEX is designed to train the staff on command and control functions and military decision making under simulated wartime conditions. For the purposes of this study, the MAPEX and CPX can be conducted concurrently. Doing so would reduce the time requirement placed on the unit by an additional four days.

Units are authorized up to eight hours annually for family activities.³ Historically, both attack battalions use this time in December for the unit Christmas activities involving soldiers and family members. It has also been the time they conduct the Class A uniform inspection and conduct the mobilization brief as well as other briefings. These other briefings are normally the OPSEC and SAEDA brief. Continuing to conduct these events in this manner allows both units to reduce time requirements by five hours. For the purposes of this study, this equates to half a day.

Table 9. Concurrent Training

Event	Event	Reduction in Time Requirement
Deployment Exercise	Field Training Exercise	2 days
Lane Training	AT	5 days
Staff Exercise	Battle Command Training Program	2 days
Map Exercise	Command Post Exercise	4 days
Class A Inspection Mobilization Brief OPSEC Brief SAEDA Brief	Family Activities	.5 days
Total Time Reduction		13.5 days

Table 9 summarizes training events that may be conducted concurrently. A review of this table finds that by executing these events concurrently, a unit can reduce time requirements by 13.5 days. This reduction in the training time requirements results in an end requirement of fifty three days. This means the battalion needs fifty three days of training time in order to conduct the events required of it if it is to maintain proficiency at the battalion level.

Available Time

Reserve units are authorized to conduct up to but no more forty eight UTAs each fiscal year.⁴ These UTAs, or assemblies, are normally conducted as multiple training assemblies referred to as MUTAs. Most personnel refer to these periods as the drill assembly. Units normally drill once a month, on a Saturday and Sunday, for a total of twelve drill assemblies.

Units are authorized to add or subtract an UTA to increase or shorten the assembly if desired. However, they are still limited to a total of forty eight assemblies annually. The total annual number cannot change. For the purpose of this study, the assemblies are considered to consist of two days each month for a total of twenty four days annually available to the unit.

Units will serve on annual training at least fourteen days during each training year. The day of arrival and the day of departure are considered as training days. A portion of each of these days must be dedicated to training.⁵ Annual training may be extended for individuals with higher headquarters approval. This approval authority is normally held at the USARC headquarters and is for extending individuals up to twenty nine days of annual training. This can assist the unit by bringing personnel, on an individual basis, on duty to help plan and coordinate for the exercise. However, the study does not consider this as a factor in determining the number of days available to a unit because it is on an individual basis and varies from year to year as to who is available for the extension and if the extension will be authorized. The study will use the total of 14 days when referring to the annual training period. Adding this time, fourteen days, to the

Table 10. Time Available to Units (Annual)

Event	Authorized Time
Drill Assemblies	24 days
Annual Training	14 days
Super Additional Flight Training Periods	2.5 days
Total	40.5 days

time made available to the unit by conducting the drill assembly, twenty four days, provides the unit with thirty eight days of training time.

Additional flight training periods (AFTPs) are authorized for use by individuals for the purpose of maintaining the high level of individual and crew skills required to ensure flying safety and meet mobilization readiness objectives.⁶ Individuals, on flight status, are authorized forty eight AFTPs annually. Both attack battalions have their personnel use this time primarily for executing individual aviator requirements and combat mission simulator requirements. Both schedule what they call a “super AFTP” weekend once a quarter for each flight company and once annually for the purpose of conducting battalion level training. The super AFTP is conducted as a MUTA 5. This means it begins on a Friday night and ends on a Sunday night. This basically equates to an additional drill, MUTA 5, annually for the battalion which gives them an additional 2.5 training days each year. The

additional 2.5 days provided by the super AFTP brings the total training days available to 40.5 days.

Table 10 provides a summary of the total time available to the unit each year. A review of this table shows that a battalion has twenty four days available to conduct drill assemblies, fourteen days to conduct annual training, and 2.5 days available to conduct a super AFTP in which battalion training is executed. The total time available to the unit, on an annual basis, is 40.5 days.

Comparison

This study identified the total time requirements placed on a battalion to conduct training to be 66.5 days. A reduction of 13.5 days was possible by conducting events concurrently. This reduces the total time requirement to fifty three days. This time represents the time required to execute the event. It does not represent planning and coordination time required for each event. The only exception to this is the planning and coordination required for a field training exercise. As previously identified, one drill before and after a field training exercise conducted during annual training are considered in the numbers presented.

This study identified three time periods available to the battalion to conduct training. These are the drill assembly, annual training, and the super additional flight training period. The combination of these three time periods provides the battalion with a total of 40.5 days available training time.

The difference between the time requirements placed on a battalion, fifty three days, and the time available to the unit, 40.5, is 12.5 days. In other words, after identifying all training requirements, events that may be conducted concurrently, and the time available for training, the battalion still requires an additional 12.5 days of time in order to meet training requirements placed upon it.

Summary

In this chapter, the study assigned a duration of time to each required event and examined which events could occur simultaneously or concurrently. The total time required of the battalion to conduct designated training events is 66.5 days. The ability to conduct training concurrently allows the battalion to reduce this requirement by 13.5 days. The end result is a requirement of fifty three days placed on the unit.

The study then reviewed the time available to the unit to conduct this required training. It identified three basic periods available to the unit. These are the drill assembly, the annual training period, and the super additional flight training period. The time these three training periods make available to the unit provides the battalion with a total 40.5 days available for training.

Comparing these two time identified a shortage in time available to the unit of 12.5 days. This difference indicates that USAR attack helicopter units cannot maintain proficiency at the battalion. Alternatives or how a battalion may adjust to or overcome this shortage is addressed in chapter 5.

¹ Department of the Army, FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training in America's Army (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1995), 11.

² FM 25-4, 35.

³ Department of the Army, AR 140-1, Army Reserve Mission, Organization, and Training (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1994), 8.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁶ Ibid., 19.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Premobilization training of Reserve attack helicopter battalions is designed to produce combat ready units proficient in their mission essential tasks capable of fighting in accordance with current doctrine. Currently there is conflicting guidance published by FORSCOM as to the training level objective that aviation units must maintain in premobilization in order to accomplish their wartime mission. A minimum training level objective is established in FORSCOM REG 350-2 of company level while an implied objective of battalion level is established in other FORSCOM directives. This conflict creates a difficult challenge for attack helicopter battalions when attempting to balance training requirements, that are not clearly defined, with the resources available in order to prepare for their wartime mission. This conflict created by FORSCOM generated the research question “Can USAR attack helicopter units maintain proficiency at the battalion level?”

To answer this question, the study presented an analysis of requirements placed on the battalion and the time available to the battalion to conduct this training. This analysis indicates that there is a shortage of time available, 12.5 days, to the battalion to train on required events that are designed to prepare them for combat. This chapter will present conclusions drawn from the analysis and its findings. It will also provide

recommendations on possible alternatives available to the units. Finally, this chapter will provide suggestions for further research.

Conclusions

The result of the analysis conducted in this study suggests that the answer to the research question “Can USAR attack helicopter units maintain proficiency at the battalion level?” is NO they cannot due to current training requirements exceeding resource constraints. This conclusion was formulated by the analysis conducted in chapter 4. This analysis showed that USAR attack helicopter battalions require an additional 12.5 days in order to conduct all required training. Twelve and a half days is a conservative number when considering it only allows the battalion to conduct the training once with no time built-in for the possibility of executing training a second time if not conducted to standard the first time.

To put this in perspective, 12.5 days in the USAR equates to almost an entire second AT period each year. If conducted during IDT periods and not AT, it would require an additional six and a half months of training. Units would be required to conduct two IDT periods seven out of the twelve months each year. This reinforces the findings that USAR attack helicopter units cannot maintain proficiency at the battalion level.

Recommendations

First, FORSCOM guidance must be as clear when addressing the training level objective for aviation units as it is for all other units. Currently, FORSCOM REG 350-2 provides a minimum training level objective for aviation units. This minimum objective is designated as company level. This creates the implication that if attack helicopter battalions maintain training proficiency at the company level then they are in compliance with FORSCOM guidance. FORSCOM has published other directives and schedules that direct attack helicopter units to conduct training that requires battalion level proficiency. This results in the implied requirement to maintain training proficiency at the battalion level if the unit is to execute major training events at this level. This creates a conflict as to the level of proficiency required of attack helicopter battalions. It creates two implied standards for attack helicopter battalions in the USAR. FORSCOM should not allow an implied level or standard to exist. This study indicates that when establishing the training level objective for aviation units, battalion level is not attainable with the current requirements placed on attack helicopter units.

When establishing the training level objective in FORSCOM REG 350-2, it is imperative that all other published guidance be reviewed and adjusted to match that as published in FORSCOM REG 350-2. This will prevent any conflicts from occurring and provide attack helicopter units with a clearly defined premobilization training objective.

Second, if the desired training level objective is battalion level, some annual events could be moved to a biennial schedule. An example of this is to move Tables VII,

Attack Helicopter Training

Annual Training - Gunnery

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
S T A F F	D e p l o y A A O c c u p a t i o n	Range Set-up and Briefs	Range Operations Staff Training (TOC/ALOC Opns; Tactical Decision Making)											R e d e p l o y m e n t	
H H C			FARP Prep	FARP Operations and Gunnery Support											
A		Lanes Training													
B		Continuous AA Sustainment Operations													
C		Range Briefs	VI	Msn	Msn	VII-D	VII-N	Maint	VIII-D	VIII-N	Msn				
D			VI	VI	Msn	Msn	VII-D	VII-N	Maint	VIII-D	VIII-N	Msn			
			Msn	VI	VI	Msn	Msn	VII-D	VII-N	Maint	VIII-D	VIII-N			
	Lanes Training														
	Continuous Maintenance Operations														

Figure 1. Annual Training - Gunnery

crew familiarization, and VIII, crew qualification, of the aerial gunnery requirement to a biennial schedule. Table VI, calibration, would remain an annual event. This would allow the weapons systems to be fired yearly to ensure proper functioning. Conducting Table VI annually would also allow the unit to rotate different crews through the table in order to enable them to experience the feel of the aircraft as it fires its weapons systems. In years that the unit is not conducting aerial gunnery training and qualification, it would conduct collective training. This would allow units to establish a training plan that builds on platoon and company collective training that culminates with battalion level collective

Attack Helicopter Training

Annual Training - Collective training

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14				
S T A F F	A A O c c u p a t i o n	Range Opns Staff Prep		Decision Making Process			MAPEX Rehearsals			Battle Task Validation		R e d e p l o y m e n t	P o s t O p e r a t i o n s C h e c k s					
H H C														FARP Opns		Lanes Training		
A		Continuous AA Sustainment Operations																
B		Gunnery Table VI STX Planning		Company STX (Focus at Team Lvl)		Company STX (Focus at Company Lvl) Aircrew Lanes Training			Battalion Battle Drill									
C											Enlisted Lanes Training							
D											Gunnery Spt			Lanes Training				
		Continuous Maintenance Operations																

Figure 2. Annual Training - Collective Training

training during AT. Figure 5-1 provides an example of an AT period in which the battalion conducts aerial gunnery. It follows the time guidelines as set forth in FM 1-140, Aerial Gunnery. In the years gunnery is not conducted during AT, collective training will be executed by the unit. Figure 2 provides an example of an AT period in which collective training is conducted. This AT would be conducted in the years aerial gunnery is not. It still allows for gunnery Table VI, calibration, thus allowing the weapon systems to fire on a yearly basis.

This recommendation would also require further discussion and research to determine the overall impact of rotating the gunnery requirement with the conduct of

collective training during the AT period. One question that is generated by this recommendation is "What is the trade-off on combat readiness?"

This recommendation basically establishes a gunnery program that allows for live fire of the systems on a biennial basis. This does not mean that gunnery training is not continually conducted throughout the year. The Army Aviation Center published an Apache Company Commander Handbook that addresses aerial gunnery. In it, it states that gunnery is a continuous process throughout the year with the live fire as only a small piece of that process. Crews are still expected to maintain proficiency in the weapons systems through use of the combat mission simulator.¹

The ability of attack helicopter crews and units to destroy vehicles and equipment is critical to the success of the battalion mission. Further research is required to determine the overall effect a biennial live fire would have on the battalion's ability to maintain proficiency and successfully accomplish its mission. Part of this research must include what is gained by the unit in terms of its ability to conduct battalion level missions by conducting collective training during AT in the years it is not conducting aerial gunnery.

Suggestions for Further Research

Current USARC guidance requires both attack helicopter units to maintain a training status of two on the unit status report. This equates to a requirement of fifteen to twenty four days to train in order to be combat ready. If USAR attack helicopter units are unable to maintain proficiency at the battalion level during premobilization, is this an adequate amount of time allotted to the units in order to attain a combat ready status

during post mobilization? If this time is not adequate, what is the correct amount that units require to be combat ready and what effect does it have on the required training level rating on the USR? Should the training level be lowered to correspond with the actual number of days the battalion will require in post mobilization in order to attain a combat ready status?

Summary

The conflicting guidance that exists as to the training level objective for aviation units in the USAR creates a difficult challenge for these units. The basic foundation for conducting training in the Army is to establish a task, condition, and standard. Without clear guidance as to their required level of proficiency, or standard, attack helicopter units have an extremely difficult challenge when trying to prepare for their combat missions during premobilization.

In answering the thesis question, "Can USAR attack helicopter units maintain proficiency at the battalion level?", the study reviewed the requirements placed on a unit and the time available to the unit on an annual basis. This review identified a shortage of 12.5 days. This demonstrated that with current requirements and time available, USAR attack helicopter units cannot maintain proficiency at the battalion level during premobilization.

¹ Department of the Army, Apache Company Commander Handbook (Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation Center, March 1996), 24.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Coates, Stephen D. "The "Truscott Trott": Training for Operation Husky, 1943." in Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, edited by Spiller, Roger J. pp. 277-282. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992.
- Higham, Robin. Air Power: A Concise History, pp. 9-21. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1988.
- Luvas, Jay. "Frederick the Great: The Education of a Great captain." The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures in Military Leadership and Command 1986, edited by Bausum, Henry S. Lexington, VA: The VMI Foundation, 1986. pp. 23-37; excerpt reprinted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, C610 Syllabus/Book of Readings, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1997, p. 72-79.
- Palmer, R.R. "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War." in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Paret, Peter. pp. 91-119. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Polmar, Norman and Kennedy, Floyd D. Military Helicopters of the World: Military Rotary-Wing Aircraft since 1917, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.
- Watson, Bruce W., Bruce George, Peter Tsouras, and B.L. Cyr, Military Lessons of the Gulf War, California: Presidio Press, 1993.

Government Documents

- U.S., Department of the Army, AR 95-1, Army Aviation: Flight Regulations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 1990.
- _____. AR 135-200, Active Duty for Training, Annual Training, and Active Duty for Special Work of Individual Soldiers, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1994.
- _____. AR 140-1, Reserve Components Mission, Organization, and Training, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 1990.

- _____. AR 140-30, Active Duty in Support of the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Management Program, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1994.
- _____. AR 140-185, Training and Retirement Point Credits and Unit Level Strength Accounting Records, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, November 1979.
- _____. AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 1992.
- _____. AR 350-1, Army Training, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, August 1981.
- _____. AR 351-1, Individual Military Education and Training, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1990.
- _____. ARTEP 1-100-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Aviation Brigade and Battalion, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, June 1990.
- _____. ARTEP 1-108-30-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Air Cavalry/Reconnaissance Troop, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 1989.
- _____. ARTEP 1-385-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Attack Helicopter Battalion, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1995.
- _____. ARTEP 17-57-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Scout Platoon, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, December 1988.
- _____. Apache Company Commander Handbook. Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation Center, 1996.
- _____. Army Aviation CGSC Student Reference Text, Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation Center, 1997.
- _____. Aviation LNO Handbook. Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation Center, 1995.
- _____. DA PAM 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 1993.
- _____. FM 1-100, Doctrinal Principles for Army Aviation in Combat Operations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 1989.

- _____. FM 1-101, Aviation Battlefield Survivability, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, December 1990.
- _____. FM 1-111, Aviation Brigades, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, August 1990.
- _____. FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 1991.
- _____. FM 1-116, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Air Cavalry/Reconnaissance Troop, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, February 1991.
- _____. FM 17-50-1, Attack Helicopter Team Handbook, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 1983.
- _____. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 1991.
- _____. FM 22-9, Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, December 1991.
- _____. FM 22-102, Soldier Team Development, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1987.
- _____. FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 1984.
- _____. FM 25-5, Training for Mobilization and War, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, January 1985.
- _____. FM 25-100, Training the Force, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, November 1988.
- _____. FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 1990.
- _____. FM 55-9, Unit Air Movement Planning, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, August 1981.
- _____. FM 71-100, Division Operations, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, August 1996.

- _____. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, June 1993.
- _____. FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 1990.
- _____. FM 100-103, Army Airspace Command and Control. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, June 1991.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 135-3, United States Army Reserve Forces Schools. Fort McPhearson, GA Government Printing Office, June 1994.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 140-3, USAR Training Divisions, USAR Training Brigades, and USAR Reception Battalions Training Policies. Fort McPhearson, GA: Government Printing Office, June 1991.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, Reserve Components Training in America's Army. Fort McPhearson, GA: Government Printing Office, March 1995.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 350-3, Specialized Training in FORSCOM AC and RC Units. Fort McPhearson, GA: Government Printing Office, November 1990.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 350-50-1, Training at the National Training Center. Fort McPhearson, GA: Government Printing Office, May 1995.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3, Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS). Fort McPhearson, GA: Government Printing Office, August 1991.
- _____. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, RC Unit Commander's Handbook. Fort McPhearson, GA: Government Printing Office, August 1994.
- _____. Headquarters United States Army Reserve Command Permanent Order F-024-05. Atlanta, GA: United States Army Reserve Command, January 1996.
- _____. TC 1-214, Aircrew Training Manual for Attack Helicopter AH-64. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 1994.
- _____. TM 55-1520-238-23-1, Aviation Unit and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Manual for Army AH-64 Helicopter. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, June 1988.
- _____. TRADOC PAM 525-5, Force XXI Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1994.

- _____. STP 1-15II-MQS, Military Qualification Standards II, Aviation Branch (15), Company Grade Officer's and Commissioned Warrant Officer's Manual, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1992.
- _____. STP 1-67R13-SM-TG, Soldiers Manual, Skill Level 1/2/3 and Trainers Guide, MOS 67R, AH-64 Attack Helicopter Repairer, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, December 1991.
- _____. STP 21-1-SMCT, Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks, Skill Level 1 Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 1994.
- _____. Student Text C700, Leadership Advance Book, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College, August 1997.
- _____. Student Text C430, Resource Planning and Force Management, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Command and General Staff College, January 1998.
- U.S., Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991.
- _____. Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Washington DC: U.S. Government, April 1992.
- _____. Reserve Component Programs: Fiscal Year 1996 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, March 1997.
- U.S., Forces Command, Reserve Component Premobilization Training Guidance, December 1, 1995.
- _____. Forces Command Training Guidance, February 7 1997.
- U.S., Reserve Command, Tiered Resourcing Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997, October 25, 1996.
- _____. U.S. Army Reserve Command Interim Training Directive for Training Years 1996/1997, July 10, 1995.

Journals and Periodicals

- Horner, Charles A. "The Air Campaign." Military Review vol 71, no 9 (September 1991): 16-27.

- Petrosky, Daniel J. "Battle Focused Aviation Training." Army Aviation (August-September 1997): 12-17.
- Stouder, Richard L. "Roundout Brigades: Ready or Not?" Military Review vol. 73, no. 6 (June 1993): 38-49.
- "Tracking the Storm." Military Review vol. 71, no 9 (September 1991): 65-108.
- Yeosock, John. "Army Operations in the Gulf Theater." Military Review vol. 71, no. 9 (September 1991): 2-15.

On-Line

- Allen, Ray J. "The ROI of CBT." October 1996, [On-line]; available from <http://www.online.com/cdrompro/1096CP/allen.html>; accessed November 1997.
- Baratz, Max. "America's Army Reserve: Building for the 21st Century." [Online]; available from <http://www.army.mil/usar/>; accessed November 1997.
- Nemeth, SrA "Training Assessment and Evaluation Technologies: Training Efficiency and Effectiveness Methodology (TEEM)." [On-line]; available from <http://xenon.brooks.af.mil/HSC/AL/HR/pubs/TP19950013/teemhome.htm>; accessed September 1997.
- Rutherford, Robbin. "History of the Army Reserve." [Online]; available from <http://www.army.mil/usar/>; accessed October 1997.
- U.S., Department of Defense, "Fact File: The Army Reserve." [Online]; available from <http://dticaw.dtic.mil/prhome/dusdr.html>; accessed October 1997.

Thesis and Studies

- Goodwin, Williard C. Jr. "A Study of the Army Aviator Retention Problem." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1969.
- Hood, Carlton L. "Determining the Optimum Aviation Organization for the Operational Level of War." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Inman, Michael T. "Operational Maneuver in the 90's: Is Army Aviation a Viable Option?" School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.

Jacobs, William M. "Massing the Third Dimension in Airland Battle-Future: The Aviation Division." School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

Jarnot, Charles A. "Air Mech XXI: New Revolution in Maneuver Warfare." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and general Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314
2. Commander, 244th Aviation Brigade
ATTN: AFRC-AVIL-OPT
3155 Blackhawk Dr., Suite 563
Fort Sheridan, IL 60037
3. Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
4. LTC Jesse D. Kreinop
187 Canyon View Dr.
Leavenworth, KS 66043
5. MAJ Bruce A. Leeson
8256 Northwest Revere
Kansas City, MO 64151-1006
6. MAJ Joseph E. Thome Jr.
48 Rose Loop
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
7. Commander, United States Army Reserve Command
ATTN: AFRC-OP--AV
3800 North Camp Creek Parkway SW
Atlanta, GA 30331-5099
8. Commander, 8-229th Aviation Regiment
ATTN: AFRC-AVIL-BQ-OP
Bldg 315
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000

9. Commander, 7th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment
ATTN: AFRC-AVIL-AQ-OP
4724 S. Parkway Dr.
Conroe, TX 77303

10. CPT Paul Scharsich
158 MT. Paran Loop
Jacksboro, TN 37757

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 5 June 1998
2. Thesis Author: Major David L. Gruenwald
3. Thesis Title: Premobilization Proficiency of United States Army Reserve Attack Helicopter Battalions
4. Thesis Committee Members
Signatures:

[Handwritten signatures of three committee members]

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution on Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement (s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow the example format shown below:

Example

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>Page (s)</u>
Direct Military Support (10)	/	Chapter 3	/	12
Critical Technology (3)	/	Sect. 4	/	31
Administrative Operational Use (7)	/	Chapter 2	/	13-32

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

<u>Limitation Justification Statement</u>	<u>Chapter/Section</u>	<u>Page (s)</u>
/	/	/
/	/	/
/	/	/
/	/	/
/	/	/

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:

[Handwritten signature: David L. Gruenwald]

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.
2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.
3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.
4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.
5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.
6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.
7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.
8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.
9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.
10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).